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Abstract
This paper posits that the concept of European identity is an important indicator of the legitimacy of the European Union
(EU). It further assumes that the exposure to EU related media content can influence the feeling of European identity. In
order to verify this assumption, we combined the mere-exposure-theory and the hostile media phenomenon. We assume
that these theoretical concepts could help to understand the influence of media on people’s levels of attachment to the
EU. Regression analyses are performed on secondary data that were collected in a Eurobarometer survey in 2013. Our find-
ings revealed thatmedia exposure affected the respondents’ identificationwith Europe, as well as themodifications of this
effect based on their assessments of EU media coverage. The results of the current study not only validate assumptions
about the mere-exposure effects on identity but also confirm the theoretical assumption that perceived hostility reduces
such effects, whereas exposure to information that is perceived as neutral promotes the effects of media exposure on the
feeling of European identity.
Keywords
collective identity; European identity; hostile media; mere-exposure effect
Issue
This article is part of a multidisciplinary issue of Media and Communication, edited by Epp Lauk (University of Jyväskylä,
Finland) and Raul Reis (Emerson College, USA).
© 2017 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
The idea that European polity requires a collective iden-
tity of the European citizens in order to support the pro-
cess of European integration is not new. Already in 1973
a normative concept of identity was introduced into
the European political discourse during the Copenhagen
European Commission Summit (European Commission,
1973). Today, it is often argued by scholars that devel-
oping and strengthening European identity is necessary
to bolster the achievements of the integration process
(De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; Triga & Vadratsikas,
2016) and that it might even help to legitimize further Eu-
ropean integration (Bruter, 2005). This assumed capac-
ity of European identity prompted many political schol-
ars to investigate the relationship of identity with several
key political concepts such as democracy and citizenship
(Habermas & Derrida, 2005), Europeanisation (Harmsen
& Wilson, 2000; Risse, 2010), European Union (EU) for-
eign policy (Manners, 2002), Euroscepticism (Hooghe &
Marks, 2005; Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008), and migration
(Favell & Recchi, 2009).
Despite being rigorously investigated, a unanimous
definition of European identity is still not available, be-
cause the concept is used in varied contexts and for dif-
ferent purposes. That is why the term European identity
is described in various ways such as “flexible” (Walken-
horst, 2008, p. 4), “abstract” (Stråth, 2002) and “hybrid”
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(Maier & Risse, 2003, p. 29). Studying and researching Eu-
ropean identity is particularly problematic because as an
idea, European identity leaves open a myriad of options
for interpretation. In parts of the literature, European
identity is interpreted as a necessary precondition, for
political integration, because at citizen’s level it promises
to foster solidarity and active participation (Walkenhorst,
2009). On the other hand, it is also considered vital be-
cause it promotes legitimacy and increase effectiveness
of the political system (Kaina & Karolewski, 2013). Con-
trary to the positive connotation of identity, the litera-
ture also highlights the contested characteristics of iden-
tity (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, p. 1; Gandemer, 2014),
and such contestation does not only exist in the interpre-
tation of the concept, but it is also present in the debate
of how it can be developed (Stone Sweet, Sandholtz, &
Fligstein, 2001; Wendt, 1999) along with its complemen-
tary (Agirdag, Phalet, & Van Houtte, 2016; Delanty, 2014)
or tense relationship with national identity (Carey, 2002).
Regardless the divergent interpretations of European
identity, it remains a key-concept for the investigation
of the future of EU. That is why researchers from di-
verse fields continue to investigate the topic and re-
veal its varied manifestations. Besides political and so-
cial scientists, also communication scholars are involved
in investigations related to European identity. Because
citizens become involved in European politics mainly
through the media, it is reasonable to expect that Euro-
pean identity— understood as a political concept—is in-
fluenced by the exposure to EU-related media coverage.
The “Brexit” might be considered as a recent example of
the influence media may have on identity. At least it was
intensely debated in the media whether the coverage
on “Brexit” was biased (Reuters Institute for the Study
of Journalism, 2016) and cultivated national boundaries
rather than a common European identity (Corbett, 2016).
In spite of the widespread assumption that media im-
pact identity, the research on the effects of media on
European identity is still rare, with view exceptions (for
overviews see, Bruter, 2005; De Vreese & Boomgaarden,
2006; De Vreese, Boomgaarden, & Semetko, 2011; Olaus-
son, 2010; Staehelin, 2016; Triga & Vadratsikas, 2016).
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to broaden this
field of research.
In the light of above arguments, the main goal of this
study is to clarify the influence of the exposure to Euro-
pean political news on identification with the EU. Con-
sequently, we first define the concept of European iden-
tity and then examine the current research that explores
the effects of media on European identity. In addition,
we highlight the research gaps in the field. In the subse-
quent section, we focus on two theoretical concepts—
mere exposure and hostile media perceptions—both of
which have not been employed within the context of Eu-
ropean identity. Based on these theoretical approaches,
we develop hypotheses concerning the effects of media
exposure on identity and the intervening effects of me-
dia perception and tested them with the help of a sec-
ondary data analysis. The results of this analysis reveal
a connection between mere-exposure effects and hos-
tile media perceptions with regard to European identity.
In the final section, the results are discussed, the limita-
tions of the research are considered, and recommenda-
tions for future research are specified.
2. Conceptualizing European Collective Identity
Collective identity is a broad concept and not restricted
to any particular aspect. Among others gender, culture,
ethnicity, religion, and nationality have been considered
as basis of people’s identity (Irimie, 2014). With regard
to the origins of such collective identities, different the-
oretical arguments offer contested views. One theoreti-
cal standpoint argues that identity is essentially primor-
dial, i.e. it is constructed from kinship, cultural or his-
torical ties that are enshrined in the collective memory
of the culture (Smith, 1992). In addition, there are post-
modernist scholarswho posited that individuals perceive
that they have something in common on the basis of
which they form an “imagined ommunity”. For these
scholars cultural and geographical constraints do not
really matter (Anderson, 1991). Contrary to the afore-
mentioned understandings, a third theoretical approach
draws inspiration from modernist school of thought
which argues that European identity is an elusive, socially
constructed and negotiated reality, something that has a
different meaning for each individual and does not really
rely on common past (Gellner, 1983).
Within the context of this paper, European identity
is considered as a form of socially constructed collective
identity of the Europeans. This sense of collective iden-
tity is not developed separately within each individual,
but is socially constructed, which means it emerges as
the intentional or unintentional consequence of social
interactions (Fligstein, Polyakova, & Sandholtz, 2012, p.
108). European identity is based on the subjective feel-
ing and sense of belonging together as Europeans. How-
ever, this paper is focused only on the political nature of
European collective identity.
In the political science literature, Easton (1965,
p. 185) termed collective identity as the “we-feeling” and
regarded it as a necessary condition for individuals who
want to cooperate politically and authorize certain rep-
resentatives to act and rule on their behalf. Hence, iden-
tity is the primary source of the legitimization of any po-
litical community and structure. Thus, in the context of
this paper, it can be argued that Europeans are required
to have such sense of community and belonging to EU,
which consequently foster European collective identity.
Without such an attachment, any governmental
regime could be considered illegitimate. In a similar vein,
John Stuart Mill (1861, p. 391) argued that collective
identity is a necessary aspect of democratic decision-
making. Consequently, the legitimacy of a new political
structure depends on an explicit and implicit agreement
that links the political community to its citizens and gives
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it fundamental institutional acceptability (Bruter, 2003).
In this context it is of high importance to understand that
different forms of collective identities do not have to be
in a conflictual relationship (for overviews see Delanty
& Rumford, 2005, p. 51; Risse, 2003; Ruiz, et al., 2004,
p. 2). For example, it is possible to have a very strong
national identity and at the same time to be strongly at-
tached to Europe (e.g. Ruiz et al., 2004, p. 8). This fact is
taken into account by various models of the relationship
among national and European identities, e.g. models of
nested identities, concentric circles, layer cake, crosscut-
ting identities or marble cake (Risse, 2010).
Despite these divergent views, scholars neither con-
cede that collective identity is not significant. Conse-
quently, researchers are interested in the factors influ-
encing the development of collective identities. The fol-
lowing section of the paper narrows the scope and out-
lines the impact of media on European identity.
2.1. The Nature and Impact of EU Media Coverage
In the debate on the development of European identity,
it is imperative to understand the role of media, because
primarily media serve at the heart of (re)construction
process of European identity (Schneeberger, 2009). Due
to the lack of first-hand experiences of politics, whether
domestic, European, or international, citizens depend
heavily on the mass media to obtain information about
political matters (Ball-Rokeach & Defleur, 1976), which
in turn affects their political attitudes (Rittberger &
Maier, 2008).
Outlining the pre-requisites of identity formation,
Thompson (1995, p. 186) argued that “identity re-
quires symbolic material for its maintenance, growth
and transformation”. In the processes of identity forma-
tion, the news media play a relevant role because of
their ability to (re)produce symbolically certain perspec-
tives on the world and our place in it (Olausson, 2010).
They “have become organised mechanisms of great sig-
nificance for constructing identities in local, national
and transnational contexts within modernity” (Georgiou,
2006, p. 11). A second precondition for European iden-
tity to take root is its establishment as a conversational
“habit”, within general public discourses, and media play
a crucial role in this regard (Gripsrud, 2007, p. 490) by
continuously placing certain issue on its agenda.
To understand the role of the media for European in-
tegration and European identity much research is done
on the characteristics of the European media system
and on media coverage related to the EU. Results show
the absence of an influential pan-European media out-
let. This indicates that “the EU as a political structure
lacks a corresponding communication system” (Kaitatzi-
Whitlock, 2007, p. 687). Consequently, the representa-
tion of the EU in the media depends on national me-
dia outlets, which are not always Brussels’ “best friends”
(Gerhards, Odfferhaus, & Roose, 2009; Hillje, 2013). This
deficiency significantly affects the provided image of the
EU. Kaitatzi-Whitlock (2007) characterized the reportage
of EU affairs in national media as scattered, offering only
minimal visibility, and having national biases; moreover,
the coverage usually has a focus on personalization and
“ethno-controversial” issues.
Norris (2000) found that coverage of EU affairs in TV
news between 1995 and 1997 was with mostly neutral
or negative tone. Similarly, De Vreese (2004) reported
findings that EU actors were often not evaluated in the
news; but, when they were judged, the tone was nega-
tive. Findings from Peter, Semetko and De Vreese (2003)
showed that most of the national TV coverage of the
EU is neutral. Another analysis on media representation
of EU in selected member states reported mixed media
coverage (Alarcón, 2010). More positive accounts con-
cerning the evaluation of the EU were obtained by some
studies on the quality press (Koopmans& Statham, 2010;
Trenz, 2007). Consequently, Schuck et al. (2011) summa-
rized the state of research saying that all in all there is
negative bias toward the EU albeit most of the news me-
dia coverage is neutral.
But, how this kind of coverage might influence the
“we” feeling among Europeans, still remains somehow
an open question. On the one hand, there is widespread
confirmation of a “crucial role of media for collective
identities” (Hillje, 2013, p. 7). On the other hand, it is
unclear how this role looks like and what effects might
appear. Because of this uncertainty one would expect in-
tense research efforts to clarify the role of themedia. But
in fact media effects research on public opinion about
the EU is still an “embryonic” field of study (De Vreese
& Boomgaarden, 2006, p. 421). Similarly, Rittberger and
Maier (2008) stated that the literature on public opinion
and EU integration has thus far neglected the role of me-
dia effects on attitudes towards feeling European.
In the literature, the few exceptions that investigate
the effects of media on European identity and integra-
tion primarily focus on agenda setting, priming, and fram-
ing effects (see Semetko, 2004) or conduct elite commu-
nication discourse analysis (see Suszycki, 2006; Wodak,
2004). Elite communication discourse analyses revealed
that promoting and constructing a specific identity is a
“top-down” affair (Shore, 2000). However, this paradigm
has shifted, and scholars now assume that identity for-
mation is not the exclusive task of elites because it also
can be constructed from the “bottom up” (Bruter, 2005).
Thus, analyses should not be limited to the discourse of
the elites, but the broad public also should be consid-
ered. Therefore, other methods such as surveys should
also be applied in order to study “bottom-up” European
identity construction.
Although there is not much research on media ef-
fects, one important finding revealed the ability of neg-
ative news to have stronger influence on political sup-
port, and European integration and identity than posi-
tive news (De Vreese et al., 2011). The stronger influ-
ence of negative news does not mean that positive news
has no effect, “but overall, negative arguments win the
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day” (De Vreese et al., 2011, p. 194). Based on the find-
ings of a more negative tendency in the coverage and
the stronger effects of negative coverage on people ́s at-
titude, it seems plausible to expect that the exposure
to media information about the EU would have a nega-
tive effect on European identity. In the following chapter
we will unfold theoretical considerations that challenge
this expectation.
3. Theoretical Reorientation: Mere-Exposure and
Hostile Media Effects
The mere-exposure-theory suggests that people tend to
develop positive attitudes towards objects merely be-
cause of the repeated exposure to these objects. No fur-
ther elaboration by the individual is required (Zajonc,
2001, p. 225). The mere-exposure effect can occur with-
out any cognitive processing, even if people are not
aware that they are exposed to a specific stimulus. There-
fore, recipients are not required to feel familiarity with
the object (Zajonc, 2001, p. 225). The only condition is
that the first experience with that object is not an ex-
plicitly negative one. These premises fit the situation of
the consumption of news about European issues. Even
though the general tendency of the coverage on the EU
is negative, the overwhelming majority of media con-
tent is neutral. Following this argumentation, the mere-
exposure-theory calls into question the prospect of neg-
ative effects.
Research on the attitudes towards foreign countries
has shown that the mere-exposure effect can be trig-
gered by media use (Perry, 1990). Some evidence also
supports the applicability of the idea to European iden-
tity. Studies that measured the frequency of appearance
of EU topics in various nationalmedia demonstrated that
the more frequently EU topics appeared the better was
the breeding-ground for a sense of community and the
development of “Europeanized national public spheres”
(e.g., D’Haenens, 2005; De Vreese, 2007). Continuous ex-
posure to news coverage about the EUmakes people feel
familiar with the EU. According to the mere-exposure ef-
fect, this perception of familiarity will lead to a stronger
identificationwith the EU. Furthermore, this effectmight
be strengthened by the tendency of selected exposure
(Slater, 2007).
It is evident that the assumption of a linear relation-
ship oversimplifies the connection between media and
identity because it ignores the role of the recipients ́
perceptions and interpretations of the media content.
Studies dealing with the perceptions of news slant or
bias showed that recipients, especially partisans, criti-
cally assess the news with regard to the issue of inter-
est and claim frequently that the news media are hos-
tile towards their own party. Therefore, a close examina-
tion of the mechanism of the perception of media biases
is necessary.
The observation that partisans frequently perceive
the media coverage on relevant issues as biased against
their own position is called the hostile media phe-
nomenon. In a seminal experimental study, Vallone, Ross
and Lepper (1985) showed that the media coverage of
the Beirut massacre in Lebanon was perceived as biased
by both, the pro-Israeli group and the pro-Arab group.
Moreover, experimental and survey studies have contin-
uously replicated previous findings on hostile media per-
ceptions. Hence, it can be taken for granted that there
is a “tendency for individuals with a strong existing atti-
tude on an issue to perceive that ostensibly neutral, even-
handed media coverage of the topic is biased against
their side and in favor of the antagonist’s view” (Perloff,
2015, p. 707). Recently, a meta-analysis of 34 hostile me-
dia studies concluded that stronger partisanship leads to
higher perceptions of media bias, but even at moderate
partisanship levels (low involvement), hostile media per-
ceptions are detectable (Hansen & Kim, 2011).
Studies that investigated the hostile media phe-
nomenon predominantly dealt with the identification of
themechanisms that cause the perception of bias (Giner-
Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Gunther & Liebhart, 2006; Val-
lone et al., 1985). Only a few studies have dealt with
the potential effects of hostile media perceptions, such
as of the support of democracy (Tsfati & Cohen, 2005),
the estimation of the opinion climate (Gunther, Chris-
ten, Liebhart, & Chih-Yun Chia, 2001), and thewillingness
to engage in discussions (Hart, Feldman, Leiserowitz, &
Maibach, 2015; Hwang, Pan, & Sun, 2008). But none of
the studies directly related to hostile media perceptions
link effects of media on (political) identity, therefore, the
insights contributed by this research provide some inspir-
ing ideas for the research on the effects of media on Eu-
ropean identity.
It could be argued that European citizens generally
evaluate the performance of the EU with regard to the
functioning of its institutions and the outcome of its poli-
cies. Consequently, they develop attitudes towards the
EU polity. Obviously the concept of “attitudes” is not
identical with concept of “partisanship”, however they
are related. From the body of hostile media research we
can conclude that it is likely, that citizens who perceive
the overall performance of the EU as (very) good would
claim that the representation of the EU by news media
is too negative. Furthermore, citizens who perceive the
overall performance of the EU as quite negative would
blame the news media for portraying the EU in an overly
positive light. However, because the evaluation of an ob-
ject is not the same as partisanship, it is also possible
that citizens with a negative attitude towards the perfor-
mance of the EU could perceive that the media draws an
overly negative picture of the EU. Correspondingly, peo-
ple with a positive image of EU institutions and policies
might observe that news media providing an overly pos-
itive representation of the EU.
Based on these theoretical elaborations we assume
that the evaluation of the performance of the object (EU)
in connection with the evaluation of the representation
of the object (EU) in the media would probably moder-
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ate the strength of the mere-exposure effect. Even if ac-
cording to themere-exposure-theory, no further elabora-
tion of the individual is necessary, recipients will always
make judgments about the sources of information (e.g.
if they perceive the media to be hostile towards an ob-
ject). We assume that these judgments modify themere-
exposure effect.
4. Research Questions and Hypotheses
Following the foregoing theoretical elaboration, two re-
search questions are posed:
(1) Does the intensity of the exposure to news about
the EU have an effect on the development of a Euro-
pean identity?
(2) Is this effect modified by the perception of media
hostility?
Themere-exposure-theory postulates that the amount of
exposure to information about the object (EU) leads to
an individual’s familiarizationwith it and hence, supports
the creation of identity:
H1: The higher the exposure to news about the EU,
the stronger the European identity.
Based on the theoretical assumptions and findings from
hostile media research, it might be possible that hos-
tile media perceptions modify the strength of the mere
exposure effect on European identity (see Figure 1). Al-
though the mere-exposure effect works subconsciously,
it is plausible that the conscious evaluation of the rep-
resentation of the stimulus could reinforce or attenuate
the mere-exposure effect. If persons perceive the media
as hostile, it is probable that the mere-exposure effect is
weakened thus we hypothesize:
H2: The mere-exposure effect is weaker in persons
who perceive the media as hostile, than in persons
who perceive the media as not hostile.
Furthermore, we argue that within the group of persons
who perceive the media as not hostile, some might be
particularly susceptible to the mere-exposure effect. We
assume that among those who are not partisans and per-
ceive the media coverage as neutral, the mere-exposure
effect is even more present than among all the others
without hostile media perceptions:
H3: The mere-exposure effect is strongest in non-
partisan persons who perceive themedia as objective.
Taken together we assume that the weakest mere-
exposure effect appears in persons with hostile me-
dia perceptions, while the strongest effect appears in
non-partisans who perceive the media as objective. The
strength of the mere-exposure effect for the others is
in between.
Furthermore, we assume that other factors also in-
fluence European identity. First of all, we assume that
the evaluation of the performance of the EU has a strong
direct effect on identity; those who evaluate the perfor-
mance of the EUmore positively will identify themselves
morewith Europe as others. Besides that, wewill control
for several socio-demographic variables like age, educa-
tion or social status, which might influence identity as
well. The complete model is depicted in Figure 1.
5. Method
To test the four hypotheses, a secondary data analysis
was conducted on surveys in the Eurobarometer 80.1 se-
ries that were carried out in November 2013. The data
collection was executed by TNS OPINION (Brussels) as re-
Hosle Media
Percepons
European Identy
Exposure to informaon
about the EU
Evaluaon of EU
performance
Sociodemographic control
variables
Figure 1. The variable model.
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quested by the European Commission. It consists of sur-
vey data collected from the 28 member states of the EU.
Overall, data gathered from 27,829 persons were ana-
lyzed. The data were weighted before the analysis. The
weighting factors adjusted the national samples for sex,
age, and region according to the share in the total popu-
lation aged 15 years and older in the EU.
The dependent variable (identity) was operational-
ized by two indicators: Citizens were asked to answer the
following question: “Please tellme howattached you feel
to the European Union” by using a scale from 1 (not at-
tached at all) to 4 (very attached). Furthermore, the item
“You feel you are a citizen of the EU” was used in index-
building. The participants were asked to indicate the ex-
tent to which this item corresponded to their own opin-
ion. Possible answers were 1 (no, definitely not), 2 (no,
not really), 3 (yes, to some extent), and 4 (yes, definitely).
The two items were highly correlated (r = .67), and the
scale reliability was good (Alpha = .80). Thus, they were
deemed suitable for index-building. Based on this index,
themean level of European identitywas about 2.6, which
was almost exactly in the middle of the scale (1–4). How-
ever, there were some differences in the level of Euro-
pean identity between the countries. The average iden-
tity in most countries was somewhere between 2.3 and
2.7. The negative outlierswereGreece (2.1), Great Britain
(2.2) and Cyprus (2.2) while the positive exceptions were
Luxembourg (3.0), Germany (2.8) and Belgium (2.8).
The independent variable was operationalized by a
combination of several items: The participants were first
asked the following question: “Could you tell me to what
extent you…a) watch television on a TV set or via the In-
ternet, b) listen to the radio, c) read the written press
d) use the Internet?” Possible answers were: 5 (every
day/almost every day), 4 (two or three times a week),
3 (about once a week), 2 (two or three times a month),
1 (less often), 0 (never/no access to this medium). Later
they were questioned: “Where do you get most of your
news on European political matters? Firstly? And then?”
Possible answers were respectively: Television, the Press,
Radio, and the Internet. Out of these twomeasurements
a new variable for every medium was calculated indicat-
ing if the respective medium was the first source for EU
news (2), a less relevant one (1), or if the medium was
not a source for EU news at all (0). Afterwards each of the
four variables was multiplied with the respective media-
use variable. By doing so, four variables (on a scale from
0 to 10) were obtained, each indicating the amount of EU
specific input from the respective media (TV, Newspaper,
Radio, Internet). Finally, an index out of these four vari-
ables was calculated indicating the overall exposure to
EU-news.
To operationalize the hostile media perceptions as
the intervening variable, two measurements were re-
quired. First, the perceived bias in the coverage was
registered, and the evaluation of the performance of
EU was traced to identify the individual standpoints of
the respondents.
The perceived bias was operationalized by three
items. The respondents were asked, “Do you think that
the [national] television present(s) the EU too positively,
objectively, or too negatively?” The same question was
repeated regarding the radio and the press. The answers
were coded for each variable as 1 (too negatively), 2 (ob-
jectively), and 3 (too positively). The three variableswere
highly correlated (between r = .68 and r = .75), and the
scale reliability was also good (Alpha = .88); thus, the
items could be used in index building. Therefore, the
three variables were summed and afterwards recoded
into three groups. The values 3, 4, and 5 were recoded
into 1 (too negatively), value 6 was recoded into 2 (ob-
jectively), and the values 7, 8, and 9 were recoded into
3 (too positively).
In the operationalization of the individual’s evalua-
tion of the performance of EU, two items were applied
for index building. The first item operationalized satisfac-
tion “with the way democracy works in in the EU”. The
responses weremeasured on a 4-point scale: 1 (not at all
satisfied), 2 (not very satisfied), 4 (fairly satisfied), and 5
(very satisfied). The second item referred to the expected
future development of the EU: “At the present time,
would you say that, in general, things are going in the
right direction or in the wrong direction in EU?” The vari-
able consisted of three values: 1 (things are going in the
wrong direction), 3 (neither the one nor the other), and 5
(things are going in the right direction). Because the two
variables were positively correlated (r = .42), they were
combined in an index. On the one hand this variable was
introduced in the model as indicator for the “Evaluation
of EU Performance” and on the other hand it was used to
operationalize hostile media perceptions. Therefore, the
index was recoded into three groups: 1 (negative evalua-
tion of the EU; 1.0–2.4), 2 (neutral evaluation of the EU;
2.5–3.5), and 3 (positive evaluation of the EU; 3.6–5.0).
To identify persons with hostile media perceptions,
the individual standpoint concerning the evaluation of
the performance of the EU must be combined with the
perceived media bias. Figure 2 shows several possible
combinations of individual standpoints and media-bias
perceptions. In the upper part of the figure, the combi-
nations, which indicate a hostile media perception, are
illustrated. The two other examples are of biased media
perceptions, but they do not indicate the hostile media
phenomenon. The evaluation of a hostile media percep-
tion requires that the person has a clear standpoint on
the issue (i.e., is a partisan) and perceives the media as
biased in a direction against his or her own opinion. Both
requirements were met in the upper example but not in
the other two examples.
Table 1 shows the combinations of the values of the
two variables that indicate the different types of hos-
tile and non-hostile media perceptions. The respective
numbers of cases of the groups are shown in brackets.
As Table 1 shows, the group of persons who have hos-
tile media perceptions consists of roughly 3,900 persons
(group 1). The groupwith a neutral standpoint and an ob-
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Posive and negave hosle media percepons
media too posive
Posion of Person A
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Figure 2. Hostile media perceptions vs. biased media perceptions.
Table 1. Hostile media perception (typology and number of cases).
Evaluation of EU
negative neutral positive
Evaluation of the way
the national media
present the EU
too negatively 2 2 1(n = 2,156) (n = 1,928) (n = 1,099)
objectively 2 3 2(n = 3,990) (n = 5,163) (n = 3,997)
too positively 1 2 2(n = 2,810) (n = 1,725) (n = 924)
Note: 1 = hostility perception, 2 = no hostility perception, 3 = objective media perception by non-partisans (neutrality perception).
jective perception (group 3) is somewhat larger (approx.
5,200). Because this group contrasts the groups with hos-
tilemedia perceptions, their perspective is designated as
a neutrality perception.
6. Findings
Regression analyses were conducted to test the
three hypotheses. In each analysis European Identity
(mean = 2.6; on a scale from 1 = low to 4 = high;
SD = 0.8) was the dependent variable and the media use
index (mean = 3.4; on a scale from 0 = no to 10 = high;
SD = 1.3) was the independent variable. Besides me-
dia use the evaluation of the performance of the EU
(mean = 2.9 on a scale from 1 = negative to 5 = posi-
tive; SD = 1.3), age (mean = 48.9 years; SD = 17.8), sex
(female = 52%), education (mean = 19.3 age, when for-
mal education was finished on a scale from 10 to 40;
SD = 4.5), and social level (mean = 5.5 on a scale from
1= lowest, to 10= highest; SD =1.6) were introduced as
control variables in the model.
In all models, the five control variables: EU-
performance, societal level, education, age and sex were
controlled, but the effects are not displayed in Table 3.
H1 refers to the general mere-exposure effect: The
higher the exposure to news about the EU, the stronger
the European identity. The hypothesis was confirmed
by the results of the regression analysis (see Table 2).
Despite rigorous control of further factors, a small but
highly significant positive effect (beta = .12) was ob-
served, indicating that people who have a higher expo-
sure to EU related news have also a stronger EU iden-
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Table 2. Regression analysis: Hypothesis testing.
Hypothesis H1 H2 H3
Sample Whole Persons who Persons who Non Partisans
Sample perceive media perceive media who perceive media
as hostile not as hostile not as hostile
n = 20,456 3,384 17,072 4,472
R2 = .20 .28 .16 .05
beta coefficients
Exposure to EU-News −.12 *** −.09 *** −.14 *** −.15 ***
EU- performance −.37 *** −.44 *** −.32 *** −.08 ***
Social level −.08 *** −.09 *** −.07 *** −.03 (n.s.)
Education −.08 *** −.10 *** −.09 *** −.11 ***
Age −.01 (n.s.) −.04 ** −.01 (n.s.) −.01 (n.s.)
Sex −.02 ** −.02 (n.s.) −.03 *** −.05 **
Note: *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05
tity. This positive relationship between media use and
identity was observed in all European countries, and in
26 of 28 countries the effect was significant (only in the
Netherlands and Hungary it was not). Among the other
countries the strength of the effect varied: In Ireland
and Estonia, the effects were the lowest (beta = .07/.08)
while in Germany andMalta the effects were the highest
(beta = .18/.18).
H2 introduces the perceived hostility as an interven-
ing variable: The mere-exposure effect is weaker in per-
sons who perceive the media as hostile, than in persons
who perceive the media as not hostile. To test this hy-
pothesis, the sample was divided into two parts, and the
same regression was conducted in both subsamples. The
first subsample consisted of thosewhoperceived theme-
dia as hostile (group 1 in Table 1); the other groups (2
and 3) constituted the comparison sample. H2 was also
supported by the results (see Table 2). The beta coeffi-
cient in the group of those who perceived the media as
hostile was smaller (beta = .09) than in the comparison
group (beta = .14).
H3 considers differential effects within the group of
people without hostile media perception, positing that
the mere-exposure effect is stronger in non-partisans
who perceive the media as objective as in non-partisans
who perceive themedia as biased. To test H3, the sample
of people without hostile media perception was divided
into two parts and the regression analysis was conducted
just for group 3 (see table 1 the group in the center).
H3 was also supported by the results. The results show
that themere-exposure effect on non-partisans who per-
ceived the media as objective (neutrality media percep-
tion) was (at least slightly) stronger than on all other
groups (beta = .15).
To verify whether these results could be replicated
in all parts of Europe, the sample was divided into three
parts: seven countries with citizens having a low Euro-
pean identity were merged in the first group (n = 8,094);
14 countries with a medium level of European identity
were pooled in the second group (n = 6,994); the re-
maining seven countries, with citizens having the high-
est European identity, were combined in the third group
(n = 8,704). The regression analyses (including the five
control variables) were repeated in these three country
groups. The findings show that the general structure of
the results remained the same. Table 3 depicts the rel-
evant effects of the exposure to EU news (beta coeffi-
cients). In each subsample the effects were lowest in the
hostile subgroup, while the non-partisan group, whose
members perceive the media as objective, showed the
strongest effect. This finding was consistent in all sub-
samples. On the other hand, the effect-strengths var-
Table 3.Mere-exposure effects modified by hostile media perceptions. Replications in different national subsamples.
Countries with low Countries with Countries with high
European identity medium European identity European identity
n = 1,388/4,329/1,097 1,004/3,798/1,323 990/4,470/2,050
beta coefficients
Hostility .04 (n.s.) .08 *** .12 ***
Non-Hostility .08 ***s .12 *** .15 ***
Neutrality Perception .09 ***s .13 *** .16 ***
Note: *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05
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ied noticeably between the three country groups. The
mere-exposure effect is much lower in countries where
the citizens showed lower European identity while it
is much more noticeable in countries with high Euro-
pean identity.
7. Discussion
Based on the results of several content analyses (De
Vreese et al., 2011; Peter et al., 2003) of media cover-
age about the EU, onemight expect that higher exposure
to media content about EU affairs might lead to a lower
European identity. However, the results obtained in this
study consistently showed the opposite. In almost all sub-
samples, we found (at least slight) significant positive ef-
fects. These findings support our theoretical assumption,
that frequent contact with predominantly neutral infor-
mation provokes mere-exposure effects, which promote
the feeling of European identity. Even the unintended,
casual contact with news on the EU provided by the me-
dia fostered European identity. These findings illustrate
the importance of a continuous coverage on EU topics by
the mass media for the development of a common Euro-
pean identity.
The results obtained also support our theoretical as-
sumptions based on the hostile media theory, confirm-
ing both hypotheses. Nevertheless, it must be consid-
ered that the differences in effect-strength were just
moderate. Particularly in countries in which the citizens
had a higher European identity, the discrepancies were
slight. If the citizens of a certain country predominantly
felt attached to Europe (at least somewhat), the mere-
exposure effect was always relatively high, regardless of
whether they perceived the media as hostile or not. This
result was not obtained in countries where the majority
of the citizens felt a low attachment to Europe. In these
societies, the mere-exposure effect was just existent in
peoplewithout hostile media perceptions. The effect dis-
appeared in citizens who perceived the media as hostile.
This finding points to the important role ofmedia percep-
tion in media effects on European identity. Therefore, if
European institutions aim to foster a common identity in
countries with low levels of European identity, it is not
enough that the citizens feel motivated to use the news
about European issues provided by the media. It is even
more important that media are perceived as neutral.
Finally, the results of the study also offer some room
to speculate about the effects of media coverage on Eu-
ropean identity, particularly in times of crisis. In the light
of the results it can be reasoned that it is not necessary
that a disintegrating event such as the Brexit or the Euro-
zone financial crisis immediately garner negative feelings
about EU despite the excessive on-going negative media
coverage. The reason for such an attribute is that identi-
ties are not constructed in a short period of time, rather
it is a long term process (Cinpoes, 2008). Thus, a crisis
that either remains in the media or lasts for short time
may not affect people’s feelings of attachment with the
respective political system.Muchmore important seems
to be how themedia coverage is evaluated by the people
in the respective countries. If people lose faith in the neu-
trality of media this could also affect the identification
with the political collective. Thus, recent attacks from
populists on the media ́s independency in many Euro-
pean countries might be an even more serious threat to
European democracy than any critical comment of jour-
nalists about the performance of the EU.
7.1. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
In the present study, a secondary data analysis was ap-
plied, which has its own typical problems. The most sig-
nificant limitation was that the analyses were confined
within the boundaries of variables that could be deemed
too imperfect to measure identity. Additionally, the avail-
able indicators of media use combined with the per-
ceived relevance of these sources for news on the EU
might be considered of questionable appropriateness in
measuring the amount of contact with European issues.
It might be argued that the respondents were not aware
from which media they obtained news about EU affairs.
Thus, the indicator did not measure an EU specific me-
dia use but instead indicated the general use of news on
public affairs. If the available indicators did not measure
EU-specificmedia use but politicalmedia use in general, it
is arguable that the observed variable relationships could
be interpreted asmere-exposure effects. Thus, to address
this potential limitation, the dependent variable (EU iden-
tity) was replaced by indicators of national and local iden-
tity. The findings showed that in both cases, the effects
almost disappeared. The beta-coefficients of the media
use variable on national identity and local identity were
quite small (beta = .04) respectively. Thus, it is reason-
able to state that we observed a mere-exposure effect.
To operationalize media hostility, this study dealt
with the evaluation of the performance of the EU. How-
ever, the evaluation of the EU is not necessarily the best
indicator of partisanship. Better indicators of partisan-
ship towards the EU would be highly desirable, such as
political party (pro-Europe or Euroskeptic) affiliations of
respondents, but they were not available in the Euro-
barometer data. Furthermore, the hostility of the media
towards the EU was measured by using only one indica-
tor (the overall estimation of bias). In general, the hostile
media research applies a fine-grained measurement of
media hostility, including, for example, the individual es-
timation of the percentage of favorable or non-favorable
references to one’s position or the perception of the per-
sonal views of the journalists.
Despite this critique, the presented results show the
relevance of media coverage on European issues for Eu-
ropean identity even for those who are not intentionally
searching for information and news on the EU. But the re-
sults also highlightwhich problems the EUwill face if peo-
ples ́ reliance on a neutral coverage of the media erodes
or even disappears.
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